it could only be regarded by the special appointee himself as a gratuitous discourtesy. By placing Professor Roth in this different frame, as though he were not a regular appointee and as though there were no significant distinctions between his situation and that of a special one-year terminal appointment, the majority of the Supreme Court reduced his constitutionally cognizable substantive interests in reappointment to zero. It followed smoothly that the due process clause had not been triggered and thus, in a constitutional sense, no process of law was due Professor Roth at all.
The position of the majority was unaffected by the fact that nonrenewal of untenured faculty members at Oshkosh was apparently highly exceptional at the time, a point the district court had emphasized both in terms of its evidentiary force regarding the real implications of regular appointment at the institution and its relevance in measuring the real burden to the University to provide some opportunity for reconsideration in the occasional case of nonrenewal. That this matter was felt by the Supreme Court majority to be of too little significance, rather than that it might somehow have been overlooked, seems clear from the fact that a footnote in the majority Opinion obliquely refers to it. That the decision is indeed a significant one which will not be easy to distinguish or to limit is further attested by the fact that the majority was also aware of the coincidence that notice of nonrenewal followed shortly after Professor Roth's critical public utterances. (The district court had stressed the coincidence as lending additional weight to some right to explanation and pretermination review as an important means of protecting the faculty member's substantive First Amendment freedom of speech.) Finally, the majority was not inclined to view the case as distinguishable from one of a limited one-year special appointment in spite of the possible far greater difficulty Professor Roth might expect to encounter in finding a position somewhere else after unexplained termination from Oshkosh following his very first year as a regular faculty member, a point also stressed by the district and circuit courts in holding in his favor. The different view of the Supreme Court majority appears in the trailing portion of still another footnote:
Mere proof . . . that his record of nonretention in one job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to some other employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of "liberty" [sufficient to entitle him to some measure of pretermination procedural due process].
Given the analytic basis of the decision, Roth necessarily deals a heavy blow to further claims by untenured faculty members to procedural rights in the consideration of reappointment, at least as a matter of constitutional right. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in this case not only reversed the judgment of the seventh circuit, but simultaneously rejected decisions from the fifth and first circuits (with federal appellate jurisdiction in the South and New England respectively) which had previously held that some measure of pretermination procedural due process was constitutionally required in circumstances like those in Roth.
Nevertheless, the different result in Perry v. Sindermann (decided the same day) complicates the picture a good deal and provides room for a number of important second thoughts.
The Realism of Sindermann: De Facto Tenure and the Importance of Collateral Effects
Neither his letter of appointment nor any state statute provided Professor Robert Sindermann with tenure as a regular faculty member at Odessa Junior College when, in May, 1969, the Texas Board of Regents voted not to renew the latest in the series of one-year appointments he had held at the College. A lead sentence in the College's official Faculty Guide itself declared, moreover, that "Odessa College has no tenure system." Professor Sindermann's situation at Odessa might therefore appear to have been indistinguishable from that of Professor Roth at Oshkosh. Accordingly, the same outcome might have been expected in the Supreme Court after the Texas Regents had secured review of the decision of the fifth circuit that had held in favor of Professor Sindermann's claim for some measure of pretermination procedural due process. (The two cases were also similar in the coincidence that Professor Sindermann's unexplained notice of nonrenewal followed shortly on the heels of news reports of his public and political activities.)
Unlike David Roth, however, Professor Sindermann was in his tenth year of full-time faculty service, the last four of which he had served at Odessa (including service for a time as cochairman of the department of government and social science). Notwithstanding the formal disclaimer of any tenure system, moreover, official publications of the College and of the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System clearly implied the existence of a de facto tenure policy at Odessa, a policy arguably covering Professor Sindermann since it adhered to AAUP standards in providing for credit for three years service at other institutions. Noting that Professor Sindermann alleged that he met the terms of that policy and had relied upon it, the Supreme Court first distinguished Roth in holding that here more than "a mere subjective 'expectancy' " of reappointment was involved. Accordingly, it held that proof by Sindermann that tenure protection was implied in fact in his case would be sufficient demonstration of an existing "property interest" in reappointment to trigger the Fourteenth Amendment and thus to require some degree of intramural procedural due process before he could be deprived of that interest. Up to this point, the Sindermann Opinion is encouraging: dry legalism is not utterly dispositive of professional security and the technical absence of formally conferred de jure tenure is not always controlling of one's right to intramural procedural due process in case of nonreappointment. Even where the state may not have adopted a formal tenure system and a faculty member's letter of appointment may itself refer only to a specific term, the existence of an official policy or authoritative practice akin to tenure may imply some degree of intramural procedural due process as a matter of constitutional right.
Nevertheless, in what may be hoped to have been casual dicta added at the close of Mr. Justice Stewart's Opinion for the majority, the description of the kind of procedural due process constitutionally assured a faculty member under these circumstances is breathtakingly slight:
Proof of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency.
Thus, the Court appears to declare that even one with de facto tenure may not be entitled as a matter of constitutional right to any pretermination procedural due process. Rather, much like the Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland, the administration may declare "sentence first, trial and verdict later." Moreover, the burden would apparently be placed upon the faculty member seeking reinstatement to overcome a presumption of regularity accompanying the statement of grounds for termination presented by the administration in that hearing. While it is very doubtful that the Court meant in any way also to imply that such a post hoc procedure with its reversal of the burden of proof is constitutionally sufficient where tenure has been conferred de jure, it nonetheless managed by this statement to take away much of the little good it had just done in identifying conditions of de facto tenure, by thus immediately eroding its strength in terms of its constitutionally required procedural entitlements.
A similar qualification characterized still another portion of the Opinions that otherwise acknowledged a limited constitutional right to procedural due process under special circumstances of nonrenewal. In Roth, the Court was careful to distinguish what it deemed to be the ordinary and foreseeable hardship of an unexplained nonrenewal at the end of an initial one-year academic appointment from other kinds of collateral consequences which would be sufficient to require procedural due process insofar as the university might itself be directly responsible for those collateral consequences. Specifically, Mr. Justice Stewart laid considerable stress on the fact that in declining to rehire Professor Roth "[t]he State . . . did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and association in his community":
Had it done so, this would be a different case. For "[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."
Mr. Justice Stewart also stressed that the decision of nonrenewal in Roth did not itself authoritatively foreclose Professor Roth from any other employment opportunities, i.e., it did not operate as a matter of law to bar him from consideration elsewhere even assuming that other institutions might regard the fact of his nonreappointment at Oshkosh as a matter of some practical significance. He was quick to add, moreover, that the collateral effect of a larger legal consequence accompanying nonrenewal would describe a different case and might well require the observance of procedural due process.
Even so, the character of intramural procedural due process which the presence of either of these collateral effects beyond per se nonrenewal may make available to the distressed faculty member is evidently limited to the possibility of securing relief only from the effects themselves. Success in refuting the institution's discrediting public statements in the course of a university hearing would still not entitle the faculty member to reinstatement. Again, the point is discoverable in a footnote:
In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University officials.12 12 The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons.
The logic of this position is perfectly straightforward, namely, that water cannot rise higher than its source: since a post hoc hearing is constitutionally required only because of collateral injury to reputation resulting from damaging public statements by the institution and not at all because of nonrenewal per se, the relief it provides is solely for the benefit of reputation and not in contemplation of reinstatement. Although the Court did not expressly say so (and quoted dicta from other cases implying the contrary), moreover, the logic of its position may likewise imply that the only required purpose of providing a hearing where the decision of nonrenewal would authoritatively foreclose other employment would be to provide an opportunity to rescind that particular collateral effect without, however, securing reinstatement within the institution itself.
Even so, the result suggested above is very much open to doubt and subject to reasonable dispute. If a public institution failed to renew a faculty member's appointment solely because it originally believed certain things to be true which a fair hearing subsequently established to be false (even assuming that the opportunity to have proved them false would not have been provided except that it was constitutionally required because the institution made a public statement about the matter), continued refusal to renew the appointment might then be successfully challenged on the basis that it can only be explained as an arbitrary reaction, i.e., as an arbitrary refusal to treat the faculty member on equal terms with others whose appointments were renewed, discriminating against him solely on the basis of an earlier belief of unfitness since refuted in a fair hearing. As the hearing itself was a matter of constitutional right, moreover, the institution could not hope to defend itself on the basis that the faculty member's decision to press for a hearing was itself sufficient evidence of lack of trust or temperamental incompatibility to decline to reinstate him. With all of this uncertainty stemming from the Opinions in Roth and Sindermann, there is yet another complexity that warrants examination. Between the tenyear instance of termination under an alleged policy of de facto tenure (as in Sindermann) and the first-year instance of nonreappointment under circumstances where the Court found that neither an explanation nor an opportunity for reconsideration is constitutionally required (as in Roth), there is a great deal of terra incognita where the majority of untenured faculty members and official institutional policies are actually to be found.
In Roth, Mr. Justice Stewart (writing for the majority) may well have been troubled by the lack of sufficient substance to David Roth's claim of any officially encouraged expectation of reappointment to fit it by analogy to a qualified or contingent "property" right, suitably to distinguish it from the claim of a disappointed first-time applicant or special appointee. The record in the Roth case, judged by Mr. Justice Stewart's characterization of it, left some things to be desired to the extent that it may not have indicated that there were official statements of criteria for reappointment and progress toward tenure consideration -statements which might have helped David Roth to provide a line of constitutional distinction in either of the two respects the majority of the Court evidently believed to be important. Designation of his appointment as a regular member of the faculty coupled with official assurances objectively encouraging him to anticipate reappointment upon satisfactory service as defined in reasonably attainable standards might have generated more substance to the view that he possessed a contingent property interest of which he could not be deprived without some measure of intramural due process. Similarly, official provision of standards contemplating reappointment in the absence of professional shortcoming or immoral conduct might have rendered an otherwise unexplained nonrenewal decision so great a slur upon the appointee's professional or personal standing as to be viewed as a deprivation of "liberty" (of reputation or contract) triggering the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. It may not parse phrases too closely to aggregate all of Mr. Justice Stewart's qualifying observations about the record in the Roth case, for instance, in suggesting that the decision may yet permit meaningful distinctions to be made in the future:
[O]n the record before us, all that clearly appears is that the respondent was not rehired for one year at one University. . . . [The terms of his appointment] did not provide for contract renewal absent "sufficient cause." Indeed, they made no provision for renewal whatsoever. . . . Nor, significantly, was there any state statute or University rule or policy that secured his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to it. ... In the present case . . . there is no suggestion whatever that the respondent's interest in his "good name, reputation, honor or integrity" is at stake. . . . The District Court made an assumption "that non-retention by one university or college creates concrete and practical difficulties for a professor in his subsequent academic career. . . . But even assuming arguendo that such a "substantial adverse effect" under these circumstances would constitute a state imposed restriction on liberty, the record contains no support for these assumptions.
Given the overall conservative cast of the balance of the Opinion, it may read too much into these qualifying observations to suggest that they mark out obvious possibilities sharply to limit and to distinguish the basic holding. Nevertheless, they may imply that on a better record, under more compelling circumstances where the faculty member is well along the tenure track under policies explicitly encouraging reliance and practices consistent with that reliance, peremptory notice of nonreappointment may not be enough to quench the constitutional claim to more specific consideration than none at all. Accordingly, the set of Opinions in Roth and Sindermann together with their full implications may now confront institutions of higher learning with a sharper choice : to avoid the "hazard" of even minimum constitutional procedures by strategically withdrawing any official encouragement of professional security for the faculty and retreating behind the ironplate of seried, short-term terminal contracts, thus to reserve a prerogative of procedural arbitrariness; or to systematize instead a policy of positive incentives with a willingness to provide some explanation and opportunity for reconsideration when so requested. It may be significant in this regard that in closing his Opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart went out of his way to note that the Court's decision was confined to a construction of the Constitution itself and that not all that the Constitution tolerates is necessarily "appropriate or wise in public colleges and universities." And again there is a footnote, by no means disapproving, comparing as an example the AAUP's Statement on Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments.
A Postscript on the Substantive Constitutional
Freedoms of the Faculty Nothing in either Roth or Sindermann at all impairs the statutory right of a faculty member to secure full redress in an appropriate federal court upon proof of his allegation that his nonreappointment was significantly influenced by considerations foreclosed by the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. In both Roth and Sindermann, the Supreme Court remanded the cases to the federal district courts to consider the merits of each faculty member's first amendment claim that the decision of nonreappointment was in retaliation for critical public utterances which the faculty member alleged to be protected by the First Amendment. With no dissent to this proposition, Mr. Justice Stewart observed:
The first question presented is whether the respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment, taken alone, defeats his claim that the nonrenewal of his contract violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that it does not.
In this respect, the decision fully confirmed prior holdings of Supreme Court cases that lack of tenure has no effect upon the substantive equal protection of First Amendment rights, and it wholly lays to rest inconsistent dicta which had appeared in certain lower court decisions (e. The procedural protection afforded a Wisconsin State University teacher before he is separated from the University corresponds to his job security. As a matter of statutory law, a tenured teacher cannot be "discharged except for cause upon written charges" and pursuant to certain procedures.3 A nontenured teacher, similarly, is protected to some extent during his one-year term. Rules promulgated by the Board of Regents provide that a nontenured teacher "dismissed" before the end of the year may have some opportunity for review of the "dis- respondent's interest in re-employment at the Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh outweighed the University's interest in denying him re-employment summarily. 310 F. Supp., at 977-979. Undeniably, the respondent's re-employment prospects were of major concern to him -concern that we surely cannot say was insignificant. And a weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due process.8 But, to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the "weight" but to For that reason the Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between "rights" and "privileges" that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.9 The Court has also made clear that the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.10 By the same token, the Court has required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process.11
Yet, while the Court has eschewed rigid or formalistic limitations on the protection of procedural due process, it has at the same time observed certain boundaries. For the words "liberty" and "property" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be given some meaning. To be sure, the respondent has alleged that the nonrenewal of his contract was based on his exercise of his right to freedom of speech. But this allegation is not now before us. The District Court stayed proceedings on this issue, and the respondent has yet to prove that the decision not to rehire him was, in fact, based on his free speech activities.14 Hence, on the record before us, all that clearly appears is that the respondent was not rehired for one year at one University. It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of "liberty" when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, at 895-896. 12 The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons.
13 The District Court made an assumption "that non-retention by one university or college creates concrete and practical difficulties for a professor in his subsequent academic career." 310 F. Supp., at 979. And the Court of Appeals based its affirmance of the summary judgment largely on the premise that "the substantial adverse effect non-retention is likely to have upon career interests of an individual professor" amounts to a limitation on future employment opportunities sufficient to invoke procedural due process guarantees. 446 F. 2d, at 809. But even assuming arguendo that such a "substantial adverse effect" under these circumstances would constitute a state imposed restriction on liberty, the record contains no support for these assumptions. There is no suggestion of how nonretention might affect the respondent's future employment prospects. Mere proof, for example, that his record of nonretention in one job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to some other employers would hardy establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of "liberty." Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra.
14 See n. 5, infra. The Court of Appeals, nonetheless, argued that opportunity for a hearing and a statement of reasons were required here "as a prophylactic against non-retention decisions improperly motivated by exercise of protected rights." 446 F. 2d, at 810 (emphasis supplied). While the Court of Appeals recognized the lack of a finding that the respondent's nonretention was based on exercise of the right of free speech, it felt that the respondent's interest in liberty was sufficiently implicated here because the decision not to rehire him was made "with
Ill
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits. These interestsproperty interests -may take many forms.
Thus the Court has held that a person receiving welfare benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of those benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process. Certain attributes of "property" interests protected by procedural due process emerge from these decisions. To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law -rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus the welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, had a claim of entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them. The recipients had not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a right to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so. a background of controversy and unwelcome expressions of opinion." Ibid.
When a State would directly impinge upon interests in free speech or free press, this Court has on occasion held that opportunity for a fair adversary hearing must precede the action, whether or not the speech or press interest is clearly protected under substantive First Amendment standards. Thus we have required fair notice and opportunity for an adversary hearing before an injunction is issued against the holding of rallies and public meetings. In the respondent's case, however, the State has not directly impinged upon interests in free speech or free press in any way comparable to a seizure of books or an injunction against meetings. Whatever may be a teacher's rights of free speech, the interest in holding a teaching job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest.
15 Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, is a related case. There, the petitioner was a lawyer who had been refused admission to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals. The Board had "published rules for admission of persons entitled to practice before it, by which attorneys at law admitted to courts of the United States and the States, and the District of Columbia, as well as certified public accountants duly qualified under the law of any State or the District, are made eligible. . . . The rules further provided that the Board may in its discretion deny admission to any applicant, or suspend or disbar any person after admission." Id., at 119. The Board denied admission to the petitioner under its discretionary power, without a prior hearing and a statement of the reasons for the denial. Although this Court disposed of the case on other grounds, it stated, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, that the existence of the Board's eligibility rules gave the petitioner an interest and claim to practice before the Board to which procedural due process requirements applied. It said that the Board's discretionary power "must be construed to mean the exercise of a discretion to be exercised after fair investigation, with such a notice, hearing and opportunity to answer for the applicant as would constitute due process.'' Id., at 123. Just as the welfare recipients' "property" interest in welfare payments was created and defined by statutory terms, so the respondent's "property" interest in employment at the Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh was created and defined by the terms of his appointment. Those terms secured his interest in employment up to June 30, 1969. But the important fact in this case is that they specifically provided that the respondent's employment was to terminate on June 30. They did not provide for contract renewal absent "sufficient cause." Indeed, they made no provision for renewal whatsoever.
Thus the terms of the respondent's appointment secured absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next year. They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment. Nor, significantly, was there any state statute or University rule or policy that secured his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to it.16 In these circumstances, the respondent surely had an abstract concern in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require the University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract of employment.
IV
Our analysis of the respondent's constitutional rights in this case in no way indicates a view that an opportunity for a hearing or a statement of reasons for nonretention would, or would not, be appropriate or wise in public colleges and universities.17 For it is a written Constitution that we apply. Our role is confined to interpretation of that Constitution.
We must conclude that the summary judgment for the respondent should not have been granted, since the respondent has not shown that he was deprived of liberty or property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. // 15 so ordered. No more direct assault on academic freedom can be imagined than for the school authorities to be allowed to discharge a teacher because of his or her philosophical, political, or ideological beliefs. The same may well be true of private schools also, if through the device of financing or other umbilical cords they become instrumentalities of the State. Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. In the case of teachers whose contracts are not renewed, tenure is not the critical issue. In the Sweezy case, the teacher, whose First Amendment rights we honored, had no tenure but was only a guest lecturer. In the Keyishian case, one of the petitioners (Keyishian himself) had only a "one-year-term contract" that was not renewed. 385 U. S., at 592. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, one of the petitioners was a teacher whose "contract for the ensuing school year was not renewed" (id., at 483) and two others who refused to comply were advised that it made "impossible their re-employment as teachers for the following school year." Id., at 484. The oath required in Keyishian and the affidavit listing memberships required in Shelton were both, in our view, in violation of First Amendment rights. Those cases mean that conditioning renewal of a teacher's contract upon surrender of First Amendment rights is beyond the power of a State.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision

When a violation of First
There is sometimes a conflict between a claim for First Amendment protection and the need for orderly administration of the school system, as we noted in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 569. That is one reason why summary judgments in this class of cases are seldom appropriate. Another reason is that careful fact finding is often necessary to know whether the given reason for nonrenewal of a teacher's contract is the real reason or a feigned one.
It is said that since teaching in a public school is a privilege, the State can grant it or withhold it on conditions. We have, however, rejected that thesis in numerous cases, e. g., 1 Respondent has also alleged that the true reason for the decision not to rehire him was to punish him for certain statements critical of the University. As the Court points out, this issue is not before us at the present time.
sented, and also with those portions of Parts II and III of the Court's opinion that assert that a public employee is entitled to procedural due process whenever a State stigmatizes him by denying employment, or injures his future employment prospects severely, or whenever the State deprives him of a property interest, I would go further than the Court does in defining the terms of "liberty" and "property."
The prior decisions of this Court, discussed at length in the opinion of the Court, establish a principle that is as obvious as it is compelling -i. e., federal and state governments and governmental agencies are restrained by the Constitution from acting arbitrarily with respect to employment opportunities that they either offer or control. Hence, it is now firmly established that whether or not a private employer is free to act capriciously or unreasonably with respect to employment practices, at least absent statutory 2 or contractual 8 controls, a government employer is different. The government may only act fairly and reasonably.
This Court has long maintained that "the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the 390, 399 (1923) . It has also established that the fact that an employee has no contract guaranteeing work for a specific future period does not mean that as the result of action by the government he may be "discharged at any time for any reason or for no reason." Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S., at 38.
In my view, every citizen who applies for a government job is entitled to it unless the government can establish some reason for denying the employment. This is the "property" right that I believe is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that cannot be denied "without due process of law." And it is also liberty -liberty to work -which is the "very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity" secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court has often had occasion to note that the denial of public employment is a serious blow to any citizen. See, e. g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 185 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 316-317 (1946). Thus, when an application for public employment is denied or the contract of a government employee is not renewed, the government must say why, for it is only when the reasons underlying government action are known that citizens feel secure and protected against arbitrary government action.
Employment is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, benefits that governments offer in modern-day life. When something as valuable as the opportunity to work is at stake, the government may not reward some citizens and not others without demonstrating that its actions are fair and equitable. And it is procedural due process that is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action.
Mr. Justice Douglas has written that
It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law. B that an applicant for admission to a state bar could not be denied the opportunity to practice law without notice of the reasons for the rejection of his application and a hearing; e and even that a substitute teacher who had been employed only two months could not be dismissed merely because she refused to take a loyalty oath without an inquiry into the specific facts of her case and a hearing on those in dispute.7 I would follow these cases and hold that respondent was denied due process when his contract was not renewed and he was not informed of the reasons and given an opportunity to respond. It may be argued that to provide procedural due process to all public employees or prospective employees would place an intolerable burden on the machinery of government. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra. The short answer to that argument is that it is not burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist. Whenever an application for employment is denied, an employee is discharged, or a decision not to rehire an employee is made, there should be some reason for the decision. It can scarcely be argued that government would be crippled by a requirement that the reason be communicated to the person most directly affected by the government's action.
Where there are numerous applicants for jobs, it is likely that few will choose to demand reasons for not being hired. But, if the demand for reasons is exceptionally great, summary procedures can be devised that would provide fair and adequate information to all persons. As long as the government has a good reason for its actions it need not fear disclosure. It is only where the government acts improperly that procedural due process is truly burdensome. And that is precisely when it is most necessary.
It might also be argued that to require a hearing and a statement of reasons is to require a useless act, because a government bent on denying employment to one or more persons will do so regardless of the procedural hurdles that are placed in its path. Perhaps this is so, but a requirement of procedural regularity at least renders arbitrary action more difficult. Moreover, proper procedures will surely eliminate some of the arbitrariness that results not from malice, but from innocent error. "Experience teaches . . . that the affording of procedural safeguards, which by their nature serve to illuminate the underlying facts, in itself operates to prevent erroneous decisions on the merits from occurring." Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 311 U. S. 341, 366 (1963). When the government knows it may have to justify its decisions with sound reasons, its conduct is likely to be more cautious, careful, and correct.
Professor Gellhorn put the argument well:
In my judgment, there is no basic division of interest between the citizenry on the one hand and officialdom on the other. Both should be interested equally in the quest for procedural safeguards. I echo the late Justice Jackson in saying: "Let it not be overlooked that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of the accused. It is the best assurance for Government itself against those blunders which leave lasting strains on a system of justice" -blunders which are likely to occur when reasons need not be given and when the reasonableness and indeed legality of judgments need not be subjected to any appraisal than one's own. First, it held that, despite the respondent's lack of tenure, the nonrenewal of his contract would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if it in fact was based on his protected free speech. Since the actual reason for the Regents' decision was "in total dispute" in the pleadings, the court remanded the case for a full hearing on this contested issue of fact. Id., at 942-943. Second, the Court of Appeals held that, despite the respondent's lack of tenure, the failure to allow him an opportunity for a hearing would violate the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process if the respondent could show that he had an "expectancy" of re-employment. It, therefore, ordered that 1 The press release stated, for example, that the respondent had defied his superiors by attending legislative committee meetings when college officials had specifically refused to permit him to leave his classes for that purpose.
2 The petitioners claimed, in their motion for summary judgment, that the decision not to retain the respondent was really based on his insubordinate conduct. See n. 1, supra.
3 The petitioners for whom summary judgment was granted, submitted no affidavits whatever. The respondent's affidavits were very short and essentially repeated the general allegations of his complaint.
* Thus the respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure "right" to re-employment for the 1969-1970 academic year is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifically held that the nonrenewal of a nontenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Sheldon v. Tucker, supra; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra. We reaffirm those holdings here.
In this case, of course, the respondent has yet to show that the decision not to renew his contract was, in fact, made in retaliation for his exercise of the constitutional right of free speech. The District Court foreclosed any opportunity to make this showing when it granted summary judgment. Hence, we cannot now hold that the Board of Regents' action was invalid.
But we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is a genuine dispute as to "whether the college refused to renew the teaching contract on an impermissible basis -as a reprisal for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights." 430 F. 2d, at 943. The respondent has alleged that his nonretention was based on his testimony before legislative committees and his other public statements critical of the Regents' policies. And he has alleged that this public criticism was within the First and Fourteenth Amendment's protection of freedom of speech. Plainly, these allegations present a bona fide constitutional claim. For this Court has held that a teacher's public criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis for termination of his employment. Pickering v. Board of Education, supra.
For this reason we hold that the grant of summary judgment against the respondent, without full exploration of this issue, was improper.
II
The respondent's lack of formal contractual or tenure security in continued employment at Odessa Junior College, though irrelevant to his free speech claim, is highly relevant to his procedural due process claim. But it may not be entirely dispositive.
We have held today in Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, that the Constitution does not require opportunity for a hearing before the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract, unless he can show that the decision not to rehire him somehow deprived him of an interest in "liberty" or that he had a "property" interest in continued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a formal contract. In Roth the teacher had not made a showing on either point to justify summary judgment in his favor.
Similarly, the respondent here has yet to show that he has been deprived of an interest that could invoke procedural due process protection. As in Roth, the mere showing that he was not rehired in one particular job, without more, did not amount to a showing of a loss of liberty/' Nor did it amount to a showing of a loss of property.
But the respondent's allegations -which we must construe most favorably to the respondent at this stage of the litigation -do raise a genuine issue as to his interest in continued employment at Odessa Junior College. He alleged that this interest, though not secured by a formal contractual tenure provision, was secured by a no less binding understanding fostered by the College administration. In particular, the respondent alleged that the College had a de facto tenure program, and that he had tenure under that program. He claimed that he and others legitimately relied upon an unusual provision that had been in the College official Faculty Guide for many years:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work.
Moreover, the respondent claimed legitimate reliance upon guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System that provided that a person, like himself, who had been employed as a teacher in the state college and university system for seven years or more has some form of job tenure.6 Thus the respondent offered to 5 The Court of Appeals suggested that the respondent might have a due process right to some kind of hearing simply if he asserts to college officials that their decision was based on his constitutionally protected conduct. 430 F. 2d, at 944. We have rejected this approach in Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, at -n. 14.
6 The relevant portion of the guidelines, adopted as "Policy Paper 1" by the Coordinating Board on October 16, 1967, reads: "A. Tenure "Tenure means assurance to an experienced faculty member that he may expect to continue in his academic position unless adequate cause for dismissal is demonstrated in a fair hearing, following established procedures of due process.
"A specific system of faculty tenure undergirds the integrity of each academic institution. In the Texas public colleges and universities, this tenure system should have these components: "(1) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time instructor or a higher rank, the probationary period for a faculty member shall not exceed seven years, including within this period appropriate full-time service in all institutions of higher education. This is subject to the provision that when, after a term of probationary service of more than three years in one or more institutions, a faculty member is employed by another institution, it may be agreed in writing that his new appointment is for a probationary period of not more than four years (even though thereby the person's total probationary period in the academic profession is extended beyond the normal maximum of seven years). "(3) Adequate cause for dismissal for a faculty member with tenure may be established by demonstrating professional incompetence, moral turpitude, or gross neglect of professional responsibilities."
The respondent alleges that, because he has been employed as a "fulltime instructor" or professor within the Texas College and University System for 10 years, he should have "tenure" under these provisions.
prove that a teacher, with his long period of service, at this particular State College had no less a "property" interest in continued employment than a formally tenured teacher at other colleges, and had no less a procedural due process right to a statement of reasons and a hearing before college officials upon their decision not to retain him.
We have made clear in Roth, ante, at -, that "property" interests subject to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, "property" denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by "existing rules or understandings." Id., at -. A person's interest in a benefit is a "property" interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing. Ibid.
A written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly is evidence of a formal understanding that supports a teacher's claim of entitlement to continued employment unless sufficient "cause" is shown. Yet absence of such an explicit contractual provision may not always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a "property" interest in re-employment. For example, the law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictions long has employed a process by which agreements, though not formalized in writing, may be "implied. In this case, the respondent has alleged the existence of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials, that may justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent "sufficient cause." We disagree with the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that a mere subjective "expectancy" is protected by procedural due process, but we agree that the respondent must be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his claim of such entitlement in light of "the policies and practices of the institution." 430 F. 2d, at 943. Proof of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency.
Therefore, while we do not wholly agree with the opinion of the Court of Appeals, its judgment remanding this case to the District Court is Affirmed.
